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P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
)
ZACHERY SCOTT SHIPMAN,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________ )

NO. 43632
KOOTENAI COUNTY
NO. CR 2014-1461
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In his opening brief, Mr. Shipman argued the district court abused its discretion
when it relinquished jurisdiction over him because, by relying on his so-called grooming
behavior and the lack of change in his static risk factors, the district court did not reach
its decision based on an exercise of reason. In response, the State argued the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman “in
light of the egregiousness of the offense, [Mr.] Shipman’s poor conduct and minimal
effort in the rider program, and the risk he presents to the community.” (Resp. Br., p.7.)
Had the district court relied on the factors identified by the State, it could arguably have

1

relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman as a proper exercise of its discretion. But the
district court did not rely on these factors.

Instead, the district court relied on

Mr. Shipman’s “grooming behavior,” the lack of change in his static risk factors, and his
poor journaling. These factors cannot support imposition of a sentence of incarceration
under Idaho Code § 19-2521 and thus reflect that the district court abused its discretion.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Shipman set forth a complete statement of facts and course of proceedings
in his opening brief. He includes this section here only to point out that the State did not
object to the statement in his opening brief that the second Addendum to the
Presentence Investigation Report (“APSI”) contains an error concerning his static risk
factors, which should have resulted in him being assessed as a moderate risk, rather
than a high risk, to reoffend. (See App. Br., p.7.) The first APSI includes a handwritten
notation on the Sex Offender Risk Assessment which states that the factor, “Ever
Cohabitated with an Intimate Partner for more than 2 years” should not have been
checked, and the same box is checked—mistakenly—on the Sex Offender Risk
Assessment included with the second APSI. (See App. Br., p.,7, n.2.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over
Mr. Shipman and executed his sentence?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Shipman And Executed His Sentence
The district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over
Mr. Shipman and executed his sentence because it did not reach its decision by an
exercise of reason. See State v. Latneau, 154 Idaho 165, 166 (2013) (stating “[a] court
properly exercises its discretion” when, among other things, it “reaches its decision by
an exercise of reason”).

Idaho Code § 19-25212 lists the factors a court should

consider in determining whether to place a defendant on probation or impose a term of
imprisonment. See State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911, 915-16 (Ct. App. 2005). The statute
provides that a court may impose a term of imprisonment instead of probation if it
determines:
(a)

There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence
or probation the defendant will commit another crime; or

(b)

The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be
provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or

(c)

A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the
defendant's crime; or

(d)

Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to
the defendant; or

(e)

Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other
persons in the community; or

(f)

The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal.

I.C. § 19-2521(1). Here, the district court relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman
because: (1) Mr. Shipman displayed “grooming behavior” on his rider; (2) his static risk
factors did not change over the course of his rider; and (3) he “did a poor job of
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journaling daily.” (9/24/15 Tr., p.51, L.23 – p.53, L.3.) These factors do not correlate
with those set forth in § 19-2521 and, on the contrary, appear to reflect a mistaken
understanding of Mr. Shipman’s risk of committing another crime. By relying on these
factors, the district court abused its discretion.
Let us first consider Mr. Shipman’s “grooming behavior.” The State now appears
to recognize that Mr. Shipman did not display grooming behavior on his rider.
(Resp. Br., p.6.) The State asserts, however, that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in considering Mr. Shipman’s “lack of impulse control” and “ongoing violations
of the [rider] rules.” (Resp. Br., p.6.) The district court did abuse its discretion because
Mr. Shipman did not ultimately display a lack of impulse control and commit ongoing
violations of rider rules. The second APSI recommended that Mr. Shipman be placed
on probation because he “demonstrated an ideal level of assertiveness and boundary
setting in the later part of his program” and “an ideal ability to be amenable to treatment
and supervision in the community.” (Conf. Exs., p.82.) Had Mr. Shipman displayed
grooming behavior—true grooming behavior—that certainly would have been relevant
to the question of whether he might commit another crime.

But the fact that

Mr. Shipman displayed interest—even, arguably, sexual interest—in other adult male
offenders on his rider is not relevant to the question of whether he might commit another
crime. (See PSI, p.73.)
Let us next consider the lack of change in Mr. Shipman’s static risk factors over
the course of his rider. Counsel for Mr. Shipman correctly pointed out to the district
court that static risk factors do not generally change. Counsel for Mr. Shipman said, “I
just want to ensure the Court understands that the static risk factors would not change
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once on the retained [jurisdiction] because they’re immutable characteristics . . . and we
would not see an improved score.” (9/25/15 Tr., p.51, L.24 to p.52, L.6.) The district
court responded as follows:
I understand that, but we’re still at an assessed moderate to high level
with conduct occurring in a controlled setting, the grooming behavior . . . .
I understand your point, but that moderate to high level of risk is
corroborated by his engaging in further conduct in a sexual nature in a
prison setting, and . . . I don’t see that fact changing that there won’t be a
high likelihood of future victims, and I think it corroborates the moderate to
high level that we’ve seen in this case if that makes sense.
(9/24/15 Tr., p.55, Ls.7-20.) The district court’s language, quoted above, reflects that it
was concerned about Mr. Shipman’s sexual conduct toward other offenders on his rider,
and believed that this conduct suggested a high likelihood of future victims—
presumably like the five-year-old victim in this case. The district court’s concern about
Mr. Shipman’s potential risk of reoffending based on the lack of change in his static risk
factors is not a result of an exercise of reason.
The only factor that the district court reasonably considered was Mr. Shipman’s
poor journaling. And it is not clear how the fact that Mr. Shipman completed only about
thirty percent of his journal assignments bears on any of the factors set forth in Idaho
Code § 19-2521.

(See 9/24/15 Tr., p.52, Ls.23-25.)

This was Mr. Shipman’s first

criminal offense. (Conf. Exs., p.8.) He had no criminal history and passed a polygraph
examination, in which he stated that there were no other victims. (Conf. Exs., pp.8, 4243, 55.) The psychosexual evaluation concluded that Mr. Shipman was both amenable
to, and interested in pursuing, sex offender treatment. (Conf. Exs., p.34.) And the
second APSI recommended that Mr. Shipman be placed on probation.
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The district court had discretion to place (or not to place) Mr. Shipman on
probation.

But it abused its discretion in making this decision based largely on

Mr. Shipman’s so-called grooming behavior and the lack of change in his static risk
factors. The district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman and
execute his sentence was not based on an exercise of reason and constitutes an abuse
of discretion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Shipman respectfully requests that the Court vacate the district court’s order
relinquishing jurisdiction over him and remand this case to the district court with
instructions to place him on probation.
DATED this 3rd day of May, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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